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Interview with ROBERT ‘BOB’ E. GOODIN, 
Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Australian National University, 
Editor of The Journal of Political Philosophy

HI BOB GOODIN, welcome to our interview series Political Philosophy Today! You’ve been working as a political philosopher for almost five decades now, and on a broad variety of topics concerning democracy, institutional design, social justice, the welfare state, complicity and responsibility, terrorism, to mention just a few. What are you working on at the moment?

Lots of little things, naturally. But two big, book-length projects have occupied me through COVID-19 lockdowns and beyond.

One – published a couple of months ago – concerned structural injustice. More specifically, it focused on the mechanisms by which advantage and disadvantage are perpetuated over time, and it went on to ask what all of those mechanisms have in common. Among the former I discussed all the usual suspects, albeit often in novel ways – status, networks, language and coding categories, social expectations, reputation and organization. The drivers underlying all of those specific mechanisms boil down to just two: beneficial scale effects, externally; and economizing on scarce time and attention, internally. The fact that all the mechanisms in view are socially advantageous in those ways might help to explain why the structural injustice that they produce is so hard to eradicate. Although that book drew heavily on a wide range of social sciences, its underlying motivation was of course normative and much of the actual analysis was broadly philosophical in character.
My second lockdown book, which is in production, concerns consent. There are a couple of obligatory background chapters. One is on the nature of consent, which I see as an ‘act of commitment’, intrapersonally in the first instance and interpersonally in the second. Another concerns modes of consenting – tacit, presumed, implicit and ought-to consent – often elaborated in novel ways. I then go on to survey a range of too-little-discussed issues with consent: mistakes about consent and who should bear the costs of them; ways in which you can ‘consent’ (or do something that carries much the same consequences as consent) without knowing that you are doing so; ways in which consent is evoked and invoked; and considerations surrounding the revoking of consent. The book then proceeds to three applications. One concerns the consent of the unconscious and the incompetent, kinky sex being my running example there. A second concerns the consent of the mute, focusing on how medics can get valid consent to treat imprisoned hunger strikers who do not want to die but cannot say they consent to assisted feeding without betraying their fellow hunger strikers. The third is what I call ‘consent by extension’, discussing how the book’s analysis of consent might bear on voting and political authority. The book closes with a vaguely deflationary epilogue, entitled ‘Consent in its Place’. Whereas much recent writing about ‘consent’ is fixated on sex, my book is concerned with a much wider range of applications than that. It dips into the history of ideas and draws particularly on Pufendorf. Law, particularly contract and tort law, also are rich resources that I draw upon heavily. Nevertheless, it is a fundamentally philosophical book, devoted to crafting distinctions and assessing arguments inspired by those and many other literatures.

My next big project will probably be on taboos and other such ‘norms of undiscussability’. That project will be a collaboration with my ANU colleague Nic Southwood, building on our previous book on the nature of social norms more generally.

Last year, you were awarded the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, sometimes called the ‘Nobel Prize in Political Science’, for having “with acuity and success endeavoured to blend political philosophy with empirical political science to increase the understanding of how decent and dignified societies can be shaped”.

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What is political philosophy, in your own view, and how does it relate to other fields of inquiry – empirical but also non-empirical such as ethics or legal theory?

I’m old school in thinking that political philosophy is fundamentally normative – ethics applied to politics, both the processes of political rule and the problems that can be solved (or caused) through politically concerted action. Legal philosophy is the same, ethics applied to legal rule. And the two obviously interact, insofar as solving problems politically often involves making and applying laws in a procedurally correct manner, where the appropriateness of those procedures is at root a moral matter.

As you observed earlier, I tend to range widely with little respect for disciplinary boundaries. Demarcation disputes are of no interest to me. The specialized expertise of others most definitely is, particularly when I am working far from my own home patch. But it is easy to overestimate how much in-depth technical expertise is really needed to make a philosophical point even about empirical matters. Let me give you an example. Back in 1980 I wrote a wide-ranging survey of the ethical issues surrounding nuclear power plants (doing my bit for the ‘Nuclear Power? No Thanks’ movement). Needless to say, the technology of nuclear fission and containing it and its waste products is highly arcane. But getting atop just enough of the technical literature to make the ethical points of interest to me was really not all that hard. Could I build a nuclear power plant based on what I knew? Of course not. But I certainly grasped enough of the technical facts to be able to say why those who could shouldn’t.

The relationship between political philosophy and empirical social science is, I have found, a two-way street. As a consequentialist I am of course particularly interested in the empirical facts of the matter concerning the causes of social problems and the likely consequences of measures designed to alleviate them. But you do not have to be a particularly hard-nosed consequentialist to believe that ‘ought implies can’, and empirical social science is far better than armchair reflection for discovering what can and cannot be done socially and politically. So I am always happy to make good philosophical use of the most reliable findings of empirical social researchers.
But as I say, it is a two-way street. Empirical social scientists stand to benefit from fusspot philosophising as well. Sometimes the philosophical contribution to their work is just a matter of clarity of purpose. The world is messy and complicated. Empirical researchers often tend to wallow in the messiness and suppose that the more complicated the model the better (because it better resembles the complicated reality they are trying to model). Philosophers clinging to Occam’s Razor can help them better hew to Hilary Clinton’s advice to Bill, ‘Keep it simple, stupid!’ Sure, it’s all very complicated – but abstracting from all that, what’s the main point?

My book on *The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, coauthored with economists and political scientists, is a good example of that. Sure, different types of welfare states prioritize different goals. But instead of leaving it at that – a relativistic ‘different strokes for different folks’ (as previous welfare-state researchers had done) – we then pressed on to explore each type of state’s performance on the best measures of each of those differing goals to make a startling empirical discovery. Whichever goal is under discussion, the social democratic welfare regime performed best and the liberal (US) welfare regime performed worst. That is a surprising finding, to say the least: Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow praised it highly in the *New York Review of Books*? It is an empirical finding in the first instance, but one enabled by the clarity of vision that characterizes good philosophy.

Or for another example, consider my book on time-use, again coauthored (on this occasion with sociologists and political scientists). Time-use researchers had for decades been collecting information on how people actually spend their time. They did that by giving people diaries and asking them to record what they were doing each quarter hour. The researchers then coded those activities into various categories: paid labour, unpaid household labour, personal care (principally eating and sleeping) and ‘free time’ (which was just the residual, ‘time not spent doing any of the above things’). But as a philosopher looking at those categories, something immediately jumped out at me. What we are morally interested in, surely, is people’s ‘discretionary time’ – how much time they had during which they could do just as they please. The time-use researchers’ category of ‘free time’ obviously underestimates that. How much time is strictly ‘necessary’ for a person to
engage in paid labour is (by the definition of ‘poverty’) just how long it takes that person, at that person’s hourly wage rate, to earn at least a poverty level income. Most people would quite like more money than that, and they work way longer to earn it. But poverty is necessity. Working longer just to earn some extra money beyond that is a choice, not a necessity. Ditto with unpaid household labour: most people probably want their house to be cleaner than minimally socially acceptable and their families to be more than barely adequately fed, and they devote more time to unpaid household labour to achieve those higher ambitions. But again, that is a matter of choice rather than necessity. With that philosophical reconceptualization of the issue in hand we re-analyzed the time-use diary data to see how much truly ‘discretionary time’ typical people in different types of households really had. Once again, the finding were strikingly different from previous ones. Using the time-use researchers’ traditional definition, women in DINK (dual-income, no kid) households seem to have about as much ‘free time’ as lone mothers. But using our new measure, DINKS have vastly more ‘discretionary time’ than do lone mothers. True, DINK women and lone mothers actually spend about the same amount of time in paid labour; but lone mothers do so largely just to scrape an income sufficient to avoid poverty, whereas DINKS do so to earn far above and beyond that. Again, empirical social scientists were highly appreciative of this philosophy-driven point. We were awarded the Ste-in Rokkan Prize of the International Social Science Council – widely regarded as the second-most prestigious political science prize after the Skyyte – for that work. But again, sociologists had been compiling time-use data since at least the 1920s; it took a philosopher to make the key conceptual breakthrough.

In 1993, you started The Journal of Political Philosophy (JPP), today one of the top-ranked academic journals in political philosophy. Why did you decide to found JPP, and can you tell me a little bit how it all started?

Foundation stories are always fun. Let me approach JPP’s from a couple of different angles.
One is personal history. I did my Oxford DPhil under the supervision of Brian Barry. When he became editor of *Ethics* in 1979 he signed up me and a couple others to share the editorial chores; and we all met annually in his Chicago flat to discuss general editorial strategy. So by the time I moved to ANU in 1989, I’d been editing a major political philosophy journal for a decade (and a major generalist journal of political science, the *British Journal of Political Science*, for three of those years as well). I had learned the knack of editing, and I had acquired a taste for it.

In Canberra, Chandran Kukathas introduced me to *The Political Theory Newsletter* which he had been editing there. It contained a lot of genuinely ‘local newsletter’ stuff, to be sure. But it also published some really major pieces that had started out as seminar presentations from ANU’s many distinguished academic visitors. I suggested to him scraping the local newsletter rubbish and turning that into a real academic journal of consequence. He replied, ‘Sure, if you’ll edit it with me.’ Thus was born the idea for *JPP*.

We soon found a publisher – Blackwell, whose demise I still lament. But we knew all too well that newly launched journals typically have an unfortunate early trajectory – a stunning first issue, with great papers solicited from the editors’ close contacts, followed by the next several issues that are basically just sucking air. So we spent the next two years building up a backlog of articles – some from really famous people, some really good articles, a few actually both. We then dribbled out the ‘top articles’ over the course of the first couple of years, so the average quality of all *JPP*’s early issues held pretty constant. That was probably the secret to *JPP*’s success in establishing itself from the start as a really major journal.

Another side to the foundation story was ‘market niche’. Upon resigning from *Ethics* to start *JPP*, I joked with its editor Jerry Dworkin, ‘You took *Ethics* down a meta-ethics plughole at just the right time for me in setting up a new journal of political philosophy!’ *Philosophy & Public Affairs* was at that time at their most clubbish. *Political Theory* had always been a decidedly mixed bag, a strange melange of historical stuff, topical stuff and Continental stuff, with just a smattering of so-so analytical stuff. Hence there really was a market niche at the time for a dedicated journal of analytic political philosophy, firmly
rooted in philosophy but welcoming to political scientists, lawyers, economists and sociologists interested in political topics and working in an analytic mode.

**How has working with the journal changed since the beginnings?**

Over the intervening 30 years things have changed hugely, of course. Back when *JPP* began, it was all hard copy and snail mail. Submissions (in triplicate) arrived by post; and they were posted out to referees, who posted back reports that were then posted on to authors. Time in the mail probably added a month to the author’s experienced turnaround time (although that did not show up in our statistics, since those just register when the submission was received and when the decision was sent out, shaving a week or so off either end).

Those were also days before every academic had a desktop computer. For those who didn’t, revisions involved laborious retyping. So for purely mechanical reasons (no pun intended) authors often tended to be less responsive to suggestions for alterations.

In those early days, submission rates were also far lower. That had various consequences. One is that there was less work to do processing submissions, but also more to do in seeking out and inviting the submission of promising papers (always with ‘no guarantees’ caveats). But perhaps the most important consequence was that when we spotted a piece with promise that needed further work, we could afford to devote more time to working with an author to refine it. Sometimes it worked, sometimes splendidly; sometimes it collapsed in a heap. But back then we could take the risk and hope it might work out. I still do some of that – but decreasingly and only on high-probability ventures, given the pressure of ever-increasing submissions.

In April, news broke that publisher Wiley will remove you as the editor of *JPP* from the beginning of next year. As a result, your co-editors, as well as virtually all of the associate editors and editorial board members have resigned; and more than 1000 academics in related fields have signed a petition, stating that they will refrain from publishing and working with *JPP* once you are removed. Wiley states “problems of communication” as the reason for
its decision; while many in the academic community speculate that all this might be the result of Wiley, a commercial publisher, trying to overstep the boundaries of editorial independence. Do you have any comments on these recent developments at JPP?

I can’t say much about that episode, or dealings with Wiley around the journal more generally, without rendering myself liable to lawsuits for breach of ‘commercial-in-confidence’. Not, I hasten to add (to avoid other lawsuits), that they have made any specific threats in that direction. But the very fact that the possibility occurs to me tells you something about the nature of the ending, I suppose.

Wiley was not contractually required to give any explanation of why they fired me as JPP editor, and they gave me none. So I can only guess as to their reasons. Thinking that there may have been commercial imperatives at work, I asked around among other publisher friends about those in a general way. I’ll summarize those conversations below. As I say, I have no idea whether any of that was actually what was behind Wiley’s behaviour vis-a-vis JPP. (Lawyers: note well that litigation-proofing disclaimer!) Still, the general is probably of more interest than the particular, anyway.

Based on what I have gleaned from sitting on editorial boards of other journals and from those conversations with other publishers, here is what I think has been going on in the larger world of journal publishing. Up to (and in some cases through) the end of the last century, publishers sold subscriptions separately for each journal. Librarians subscribed or not to any given journal on the basis of their (or their local advisers’) perceptions of journal quality. Hence, back in those days, the publisher’s commercial interest in maximizing subscription income aligned perfectly with the editors’ interest in publishing an academically high-quality product.

In the years since, publishers began selling their journals to libraries packaged in a ‘bundle’. In that world, the quality of any given journal matters less, and the sheer volume of what was in the bundle comes to matter much more. Often those bundled products are sold to purchasing consortia of many libraries, further reducing the power of any given librarian to exercise quality control via purchasing decisions.

The Open Access beat-up has, inadvertently, been the death
knell of quality academic publishing, driving a fatal wedge between the incentives of publishers and those of journal editors. There are various different models that publishers are employing to come to grips with the Open Access world, and each of those models has its own implications for what pressures publishers are incentivized to put on the editors of their journals.

Abstracting from particularities, one fact seems to dominate almost all of those approaches, directly or indirectly. That fact is just this. The profits of commercial publishers are increasingly a function of ridiculously large Open Access fees, whether paid by the author, the grant-giver or (nowadays most typically) the author’s home institution or national government through ‘Read and Publish Transformative Agreements’. The way to maximize those profits is to maximize the number of articles a journal publishes – and to do so without regard to quality. (As I have said, given bundling and consortia, no library can unsubscribe to an individual journal of diminishing quality anyway, so a journal’s quality is no longer a commercial concern to publishers seeking to maximize profits.)

In that New World of journal publishing, publishers are incentivized to pressure editors to increase, sometimes radically, the numbers of articles published. They may pompously pretend that doing so is in the interest of ‘good science’, given the greatly increased number of papers being written every year. But that argument assumes that all of that new stuff is of the same average quality as the old – which a publisher has no way of knowing, and which in my experience as JPP’s editor is radically untrue. JPP experienced multiple doublings of its submissions over my time as editor. But the number of ‘really good’ submissions always remained almost literally constant, in absolute terms; the extra submissions virtually all fell in the unpublishable tail of the distribution. I say that as an editor famous for publishing good first pieces from unknown authors just starting their careers, and as someone whose journal publishes more articles from non-Anglophone authors than any comparator. So I say that not out of Ivy League snootiness. (Indeed, I consistently reject more of their articles than I publish.) It is a quality assessment, pure and simple.

Blogsphere is full of bleating that journals should increase the number of articles being accepted, on the grounds that ‘my article was no
worse than the worst article appearing there that year’. In most cases that is simply untrue. (I do freely admit, however, that in some years JPP published an article or two that we would not have done had we not been contractually obliged to publish a certain number of articles per year.) But suppose the claim were true, and just do the maths. Publishing more articles that are equally bad as the worst articles published would automatically reduce the average quality of articles in the journal – that is an unavoidable fact of simple arithmetic. Of course, each author of an almost-as-good article has an interest in their own article being accepted – but only theirs. If every almost-as-good article were published, the value of publishing in the venue would nosedive, to the chagrin of all authors publishing there. It is a classic collective action problem. In that Tragedy of the Commons, the role of the editor is to be The Enforcer, against both self-serving authors in the blogsphere and self-serving commercial publishers in the share market.

The future of JPP is rather uncertain at this point. But generally speaking, do you have a vision of the future of peer reviewed journals that you think is viable and promotes academic values?

What is the future of academic journal publishing, in political philosophy and beyond? Some say ‘just let it rip’. Just let everything be published in some way or another, either in undiscriminating academic journals or on the internet. Promulgation would thus be maximized. Gatekeeping, understood as preventing something from appearing in public view, would be eliminated.

Now, I appreciate as much as the next guy the value of the internet as a treasure trove of academic resources. I spent a year as visiting fellow at the US National Institutes of Health, where my office was virtually adjacent to the largest medical library in the world. But not being a medical researcher, that was useless to me. I could have spent an hour trekking down to the Georgetown University library. But first I tried to find the same or similar stuff on the internet; I always could, so I never made the trek and I blessed the internet. Hence I wholly agree that making lots of material generally available is academically a very good thing.
The upshot is simply that ‘making things generally available’ is not the exclusive prerogative of journals anymore. Given that fact, however, what is the value added by a journal?

Surely it lies simply in telling you what, among all the myriad things available out there in cyberspace, you should bother reading. And if that is the primary function of a journal, it is crucial that the guidance it provides be more rather than less selective. Selective journals serve an attention-guiding service: they say ‘these are the things that you really need to read’ (certainly if you are interested in the particular topic, but even if you just want a good overview of general developments in your field).

Take *Philosopher’s Annual*, for example. It reprints the ten-best articles across all of philosophy each year. If it reprinted the hundred best, or thousand best, it would simply cease to provide any guidance as to where we should best invest our inevitably limited time and attention. Consider the contrasting case of *The Philosopher’s Index*, which indiscriminately publishes abstracts of all papers published – ‘650,000 records from publications [...] from 139 countries and 37 languages’, as its website boasts. Maybe that sort of publication can help scholars to pad out their literature reviews. But it cannot remotely tell people ‘what is really important here’. Only a much more discriminating source like a highly selective academic journal can do that.

I used to joke with my minders at Blackwell, back when *JPP* was published by them, ‘What is *JPP* but “Bob’s picks”? ’ The subtext: if the publisher got too intrusive, I could always just resign and invite people to send me urls of their recently posted unpublished papers; and I would then curate a list of ‘Bob’s picks’ and post links to what I regarded as the best among them. It was a joke back then (although one that the people at Blackwell, far more cluey than their successors, had the sense to take seriously). That, or something like it, may be the way forward if we want to preserve the quality-control function that highly selective academic journals have historically performed for the scholarly community.

*JPP*, quite like *Tidskrift för politisk filosofi* — and even more so the field of political philosophy itself — has been historically dominated by white males. What are your thoughts on the continued...
underrepresentation of women and marginalised social groups in political philosophy?

There are multiple distinctions to be made, here. (Ever the philosopher, making distinctions: apologies!). The first picks up on your use of ‘historical’: that raises the ‘then and now’ issue. The second picks up on an equivocation between the proportion of a demographic in the profession and its proportion among authors in a journal.

Yes, historically philosophy in general, and political philosophy as well, were very much dominated by white males. That said, once you get below the ‘top ten of all time’, some of the most interesting were non-white and/or non-male. (Remember that Saint Augustine was a North African Berber.) But, historically, that’s broadly a fair cop. Among the current crop, however, there are way more non-males and at least some more non-whites, etc. There has definitely been movement in the right direction, even if not enough of it. Alas, I do not have any particular insights as to how to speed that process up across the profession as a whole.

That addresses the question of ‘the proportion of the target group in the population of political philosophers in general’. Let me turn now to the narrower question of whether journals publish the right proportion of articles from those demographics. A familiar saying among editors, when criticized for not publishing more on some specific topic, is that: ‘We cannot publish what we are not offered.’ It is equally true that we cannot publish things from people who are not there to offer them. So the right way of judging whether any given journal is publishing ‘enough’ papers from any given demographic is surely to compare the demographic profile of the journal’s authors with that of the profession as a whole.

In those terms *JPP*, anyway, has always been just about ‘on target’. Statistics on the proportion of some groups in the profession overall can be hard to come by, of course. But best we can tell, *JPP* publishes women and Afro-Americans in about the same proportion as they are represented in the profession.¹⁷ *JPP* also publishes a great many articles from people in countries where English is not the first language, which has recently become another sensitive dimension of difference.¹⁸ Other top political philosophy journals do not do quite so well across all the
relevant dimensions. Still, in recent years *Philosophy & Public Affairs* has published only a slightly smaller proportion of women and *Ethics* only a slightly smaller proportion again.¹⁹ Both are a bit further behind when it comes to racial and linguistic diversity, however.²⁰

I hasten to add that *JPP*, at least, has not done that by putting the thumb on the scale in favour of submissions from any particular demographic. All we have done is to ‘show an interest’ in things that those groups are interested in; and we have published the best of the work from those demographics because it truly was interestingly different from the run-of-the-mill submissions, which are too often boring epicycles on what in any case were by then ‘tired topics’ (in the words of one of the ‘form rejections letters’ we used at *Ethics* back in the 1980s). Let me give just one example. When discussing whether migrants should get voting rights, that question is usually posed from the perspective of the ‘receiving country’ – the country to which the person has migrated. Claudio López-Guerra, a Mexican, pointed out that the issue looks very different from the perspective of the ‘sending country’ – the country from which people have migrated and to which they (and their descendants, who acquire citizenship and hence voting rights via *jus sanguinis*) may have no lingering ties.²¹

It would be drawing too long a bow to insist that scholars from demographics that are generally underrepresented in political philosophy are in a privileged position *tut court*. Still, owing to their differing experiences they often have something interestingly different to say, philosophically. And that is surely worth something, both to them and to the profession as a whole.

**And lastly, do you have any advice for young political philosophers and philosophy students?**

Well, I wrote out an advice sheet on ‘how to write analytic political philosophy’ that has been published elsewhere.²² It was written for Chiara Lepora, another mid-career research fellow in bioethics alongside me at the US National Institutes of Health. She was a physician who had spent several years managing MSF missions in conflict zones, and she wanted to write about issues of complicity arising out
of that. But she had no background in philosophy. So that advice was written for a very special sort of neophyte, but I think most of it would be useful for beginning philosophers of any sort. For those without easy access to that book, my basic advice is: keep it short, keep it simple, and remember that ‘clear’ is the highest term of praise in analytic philosophy.

I rather hesitate to give more detailed advice than that these days, because I have a sense that my preferred way of doing political philosophy may well be a thing of the past. What I would once have said is the ticket to success – and the sort of piece that I would myself still most enjoy reading – essentially ignores ‘the literature’ and just develops some wholly novel insight. And that’s the advice I would still dearly wish to be able to give. Find a problem all your own, preferably growing out of real-world experience. Do not try to ride the crest of the latest fad (by the time your PhD is finished it will be passé rather than cutting-edge anyway). The seemingly-safe strategy of providing a further tweak to some ongoing literature is actually a hiding to nothing. After the first couple of big papers have mapped out the basic moves, and the first couple of major critiques have shown the big holes, no one cares about the further epicycles. That seemingly-safe strategy is actually just a guaranteed route to becoming academically inconsequential.

Yet those are the sorts of papers that many journals now seem to prefer. The modal political philosophy article these days starts and almost finishes with an extensive review of largely extraneous literature, with only a brief tailpiece teaser gesturing at an argument that cannot be developed in the little space remaining. Why anyone would want to write, read or publish that sort of thing is utterly beyond me. But that seems to be the norm and the expectation these days in all too many journals and among all too many employers who count publications instead of reading them.

Still, fads and fashions come and go quickly in the academic world. So this too may pass. Perhaps the best advice is therefore: ‘Follow your own nose, do good philosophy in your own way, and just hope that it will come to be appreciated!’

Katharina Berndt Rasmussen

Förhandspublicering inför Tidskrift för politisk filosofi № 2 2023
Notes

1. Robert E. Goodin, Perpetuating Advantage: Mechanisms of Structural Injustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023). A video of me presenting the main findings to the Institutet för Framtidsstudier can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7mz_sREizvU.


9. Or literal cut-and-pasting – although I might have been the only author ever to have sent final copy to a printer in that form.

10. For my earlier commentary on the publishing landscape, see my contribution celebrating the anniversary of another journal that I used to edit: Robert E, Goodin, ‘The career of a generalist journal’, British Journal of Political Science, 40 (2010), 1–10.

11. And price, to some extent. When I was on my university’s Library Committee as it faced budget cuts back in the 1980s, we were presented with a list of journals and what they cost. I pointed out that all the required savings could be made by cancelling a single journal, Chemical Abstracts, which anyway contained no original research and only led to further costs for the library in the form of Interlibrary Loan requests. Needless to say, the chemist on the committee was having none of it and the librarian capitulated to him.

12. As I say, I cannot reveal what Wiley was demanding of JPP which is ‘commercial-in-confidence’. But at one point Wiley was demanding that another of its journals, Philosophy & Public Affairs, increase its articles by a factor of 10 (according to a blog post by Annie Stilz, ‘Update 3, 4/28/23’, at
https://dailynous.com/2023/04/27/wiley-removes-goodin-as-editor-of-the-journal-of-political-philosophy/). That was obviously an absurd demand. But seemingly much more modest demands, like increasing the size of a journal by ‘just’ 10% year-on-year, would cumulatively have the very dramatic effect (of, in that case, doubling the size of the journal every ten years).

13. My proudest boast in that connection is an article that JPP published on the concept of ‘freedom’ in the Sub-Saharan African language of ChiBemba. I am not only proud of have published that piece; I am also even more proud of actually having found a native speaker of the language (an PhD student in Demography at ANU) to referee it. See Chisanga Siame, “Two concepts of liberty” through African eyes’, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8 (2000), 53–67.


16. ‘Or something like it’, because of course it would require committee of editorial advisers with the capacity to take external advice on submissions beyond the committee’s competence. There has been a suggestion that the selection should instead be crowd-sourced by voting on the internet; Marcus Arvan, Liam Kofi Bright and Remco Heesen, ‘Jury theorems for peer review’, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, forthcoming, https://doi.org/10.1086/719117. But just as ‘citation rings’ can skew a scholar’s citation count, so too can ‘mutual support networks’ skew voting in internet polls, as has apparently happened in the ones published at *Leiter Reports* (https://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2022/08/specialist-journals-that-publish-the-best-articles-in-moral-andor-political-philosophy-the-results.html#comments). As JPP editor, I have become deeply suspicious that similar institution-based or topic-based backscratching networks may well be at work in the refereeing process.


18. Guerrero, ‘Demographic diversity of authors in four leading moral and political philosophy journals’. The ‘Barcelona Principles for a Globally Inclusive Philosophy’ declaration can be found at https://contesi.wordpress.com/bp/.
20. Guerrero, ‘Demographic diversity of authors in four leading moral and political philosophy journals’.
24. For most of my half-century in the business, if you asked a publisher what it took to turn a PhD dissertation into a publishable book, they would invariably tell you first and foremost to ‘get rid of the literature review’. As my doctoral supervisor said in his own doctoral book, if you admire and want to emulate the great Greek philosophers, stop looking over your shoulder at what others have written and think for yourself; Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 290.